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In the general context of cultural studies, this article considersthree constructs that have featured prominently in the field (aswell as in other contexts):
• a kind of critique designated with the prefix “post-”, with post-
modernism and poststructuralism being the most prominent;
• the precepts of a critical discourse known as “multiculturalism”,
and
• the concept of “Africa”.
All three of these constructs may also be said to be of major relevance
to ideology theory — and this goes for “critical theory” as well. They
represent, as it were, three intertwined perspectives of cultural critique.
I would like to consider these three perspectives and their interrela-
tionships critically, within the framework of a specific ideology
theory, the “ideological topography of modernity”, or the ITM mo-
del. I will also explain why I believe that this particular theory of
ideology, and the application I am attempting here, may be conducive
to a kind of “posthumanism”. However, given the formal-methodological
aspect of ITM, such a connection is by no means necessary. On the
other hand, a posthumanist worldview may just as well attach itself
to the larger theoretical enterprise of which I take ideology theory to
be part, an enterprise introduced elsewhere as “discourse archaeology”
(Visagie 2001). Although this archaeological theory includes various
subtheories besides ideology theory, and although some of these other
theories (for example logosemantic theory and metaphor theory) are
undoubtedly useful for a comprehensive critical understanding of
postmodernism, multiculturalism and Africa, I will limit myself here
specifically to the focus on ideology as the basic context of analysis.
The analysis which follows may be compared to a series of concentric
circles. We will begin with the broadest methodological-theoretical
context (discourse archaeology); move quickly into the specialised
theory of ideology; take two steps back again, to explore the still
broader context of a posthumanist worldview and its relation to post-
modernism; proceed again beyond ideology theory to a more con-
tracted view and a more limited theme, namely the application of
ideology analysis to the discourse of multiculturalism, and ultimately
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narrow the perspective still further, so as to focus on Africa and
finally on South Africa and Afrikaner culture.
1. Discourse archaeology and the task of ideology 
theory
The most natural way to approach an encompassing ideology theory,
is to regard it as an integral part of discourse archaeology (which can
be thought of as a philosophical specialisation). It is concerned, roughly
speaking, with the ultimate “grounds” that many different kinds of
discourses portray themselves as uncovering (grounds such as “God”
or “Nature” or “Society” or “Science”); but also with uncovering the
deeper grounds of such discourses themselves, and ultimately of
discourse as such – whether it belongs to a scientific-theoretical, or an
everyday-practical, or an aesthetic-artistic context.1
These archaeological excavations can be undertaken on different
levels, with different goals, utilising different methodological tools.
Thus, a discourse archaeology should consist, in my view, of different
kinds of analyses or subtheories. The version of discourse archaeolo-
gy that I find the most useful (the DA model) involves a whole com-
plex of such subtheories concerned with typical archaeological themes,
such as:
• the kind of ultimate determination signified by the notion of
principles (in any field of knowledge);
• the basic structural “postures” of the human condition (joy and
suffering, work and reflection, etc);
1 The practice of (a form of) discourse archaeology is present in the work of the
well-known French philosopher Michel Foucault, for example. Derrida’s fasci-
nation with, and work on the problem of the origin is also an archaeological
enterprise. Like Ricoeur, Foucault actually uses the term “archaeology”, but
much more systematically, as the label has a bearing on the basic nature of his
work. Eventually, however, he had come to reserve the term for only part of his
project, the main themes of which, namely the historically constituted deep
structures of knowledge, power and subjectivity, would actually fall under one
of the subtheories of discourse archaeology, the version discussed here (see be-
low, where mention is made of cross-cultural themes).
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• the basic framework of concrete ethical life (in both individuals
and communities);
• the conceptual-semantic ground-structures of philosophical dis-
course (the way in which formulas like “cultural context determines
everything” are constituted);
• the metaphorical ground-structures of conceptualisation (as in the
work on metaphor and conceptual blending by George Lakoff,
Mark Johnson, Mark Turner and others);
• the cross-cultural ground-themes that inspire intellectual awe in
communities and individuals; themes that come into conflict
with one another, each being believed to constitute a kind of ul-
timate horizon (such as nature, knowledge, power, and person-
hood);
• the grounding of culture and society in rationality, creativity and
communication,
as well as other topics of similar import, like truth theory and
philosophy of mind.
Among these topics is the theme of the ideological structure of
discourse. I take this to be the analysis of how discourses are shaped
and determined through various forms of domination. Of course, in
the archaeological perspective, discourses are also determined in other
ways (hence diverse subtheories); ideological relations are only part of
the picture. To think that everything can be explained by relations of
domination is actually to fall prey to a specific form of ideological
domination.2
2 Let me briefly illustrate the way in which the conceptual-semantic, metapho-
rical and ideological subtheories, for example, link up to the three levels or
stages of archaeological analysis mentioned above. First, such analysis selects
and compares discourses celebrating some kind of ground, origin, or centre:
Nature or Culture, for instance (to keep to familiar, “grand” examples). Secondly,
the analysis focuses on the originating structures whereby such a discourse is
actually generated. This is where discourse archaeology really gets to work. For
example, the actual conceptualisation process that relates Nature to society, or
Culture to science, in a very specific way, would be analysed by the DA sub-
theory dealing with conceptual-semantic ground-structures. The metaphorical
nature of such conceptualisations would be analysed by the DA subtheory deal-
ing specifically with this aspect, while the ideological paradigm within which
Naturally, postmodernists would tend to protest against the pro-
ject of a discourse “archaeology”. The very notion of studying “grounds”
or “origins” of some foundational kind would seem to them to have
been sufficiently “deconstructed” by Derrida, Rorty and others. But
such perceptions are themselves simply confused and, indeed, highly
“deconstructable”. It has repeatedly been shown that Derridean or
Rortyan discourse (to take them as examples) cannot escape postula-
ting its own origins — be it the flux of signifiers or social contingen-
cy, or whatever. In fact, I would contend that what we know of the
nature of thinking makes it impossible for anyone to launch a large-
scale critique of knowledge, culture, or society without conceptuali-
sing grounds, origins, ends, roots, or centres of some sort. And the
clear or veiled presence of such terms in postmodernist discourses
cannot be explained away by some kind of verbal magic, to the effect
that we should not allow words to mean what they plainly, and in
context, do mean.3
Leaving aside the larger context of discourse archaeology (and the
DA version of such an enterprise), I will now focus on the requirements
for a minimally satisfying ideology theory. I will refer to one possible
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the cognitive constructions find expression (for example “New Age” naturalism
or ethno-nationalistic culturalism) would be analysed by the DA subtheory of
ideology. (The domination features of ideology will be discussed below.) Thirdly,
conceptual-semantic, metaphorical and ideological structures (among others)
come into archaeological view as origins or grounds or centres in their own
right, but each within a field of operation that is severely limited by the others.
This is the only kind of relativism of “origins” and “centres” that is really rational
and realistic (cf Visagie 1994, 1996 & 2001).
3 In the case of Derrida, for example, his dependence on origins (or transcend-
ence) of some kind comes to clear expression in statements such as this: “Un-
conditional hospitality is transcendent with regard to the political, the juridic-
al, perhaps even to the ethical” (Borradori 2003: 129). Note how the DA
subtheory of cross-cultural ground-themes (according to which the concept of
society, abstracted from its coherence with similar themes like nature or person-
hood, is one of the origins ceaselessly invoked in theoretical thought, whether
ancient, modern or “postmodern”) and of conceptual ground-structures (accord-
ing to which the notion of “fluctuating language” is as much philosophically
structured as is the metaphysical notion of eternal ideas) hovers in the back-
ground of the critical view expressed here.
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version of such a theory, the one to be implemented below, as the ITM
(“ideological topography of modernity”) model.4
2. Nine criteria for ideology theory
The following nine criteria, briefly listed, indicate what I think a
comprehensive theory of ideology (with practical as well as methodo-
logical intent) should conform to, and, I would contend, govern the
design of the ITM model (which is of course not to say that this
model is devoid of the typical problems of theories, as such:
• First, the term “ideology” is to be taken in its negative or critical
(as opposed to neutral) sense, which has proven to be its only
really interesting sense, as the literature attests.5
• Secondly, the critical concept of domination should be fully ex-
ploited so that we can speak of ideological mechanisms on a cogni-
tive as well as a social level.6 Ideology analysis thus deals with the
way in which certain norms, values or goals dominate other norms,
values or goals as well as (familiarly) with the way in which certain
groups in society dominate others.
• Thirdly, both spheres of domination should be conceived of as
consisting of a multiplicity of “formations”.7
• Fourthly, the complexity of the ideological world should include
the way in which ideological formations evoke counter-measures
that themselves immediately tend to lapse into ideological patterns.8
4 Thus, ITM theory forms part of DA theory, but both represent only possible
versions of an ideological and an archaeological theory.
5 Against the theoretical usage that excludes all but a “worldview” connotation
of the term, for example in “sociology of knowledge” contexts.
6 Against the classic Marxian conception and its “critical theory” variants, as well
as theories of dominating cultural discourses that alternatively ignore social
forms of domination.
7 Against theories that target either a unitary cultural complex such as “science-
technology”, to which “capitalism” is sometimes added, or a simple social cate-
gory like “class”.
8 Against theories that see the whole of society and culture in the relentless grip
of some central dominating power — except for the few enlightened critics.
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• Fifthly, ideology theory should encompass not only relations of
domination (in both senses) in “ordinary/everyday” culture and
society, but also in the specialised arenas of scientific-theoretical
and artistic-aesthetic discourses, for example.9
• Sixthly, ideology theory should distinguish sharply between power
(which is not in the service of ideology as such) and domination
(into which power is transformed, almost invariably, if only par-
tially).10
• Seventhly, an adequate ideology theory should be able to explain
the shortcomings of other conceptions of ideology “structurally”,
while simultaneously addressing and reconstructing the “truth
elements” of these conceptions.11
• Eighthly, ideology theory must in itself be a theoretically sophis-
ticated construct, capable of complex distinctions, far-reaching
generalisations, and novel and non-apparent abstractions and ex-
planations. On the other hand, in appropriate contexts, it must be
communicated in simplified terms, in an informal and “popularising”
mode.12
• Ninethly, an ideology theory should be strongly self-critical, and
see itself as unavoidably enmeshed in at least some of the very
relations of domination that it aims to critique.13
9 Against theories that fail to generalise the concept of ideology sufficiently —
most, in fact.
10 Against the ubiquitous demonisation of power, for example in the negative eva-
luation of the very concept of the state.
11 Against theories that are structurally unable to enter into this kind of inter-
theoretical communication.
12 Against both the postmodernist and the scientistic-rationalistic detractors of
social “theory”, with the political Chomsky at the forefront of the latter.
13 With reference to the “truth elements” criterion, the ITM model can structu-
rally “locate” (elements of) the conceptions of the following thinkers (in parti-
cular): Habermas, Chomsky, Foucault, Lyotard, Heidegger, Marcuse, Horkheimer/
Adorno and Christopher Lasch. Less well-known Christian philosophers whose
insights can be reconstructed are: Jacques Ellul, Herman Dooyeweerd, D H
Vollenhoven, H van Riessen, Bob Goudzwaard and Calvin Seerveld. Connections
between ITM and the work of these social and cultural critics are discussed in
Visagie 1994. Probably the only ideology theorist who has given notable ex-
pression to this ideal is Adorno.
3. Fleshing out ITM: the lie of the land
In this section I will briefly survey some key features of a specific ap-
proach to ideology analysis, namely the ITM model referred to above.
The overview will note some of the basic structural components of
the model: spheres, worlds, levels, formations, mechanisms, strategies,
and so on. This will be followed by a reference to two “adjacent”
theories — that is, theories or subtheories that are conceptually ad-
jacent to ideology theory (within an overall archaeological architect-
ure). This is necessary since these theories involve distinctions that
will be needed later, when we come to evaluate multiculturalism and
“Africa”. Finally, I will remark on the specific relation of ITM to the
nine criteria we have just outlined.
But, by way of a more general perspective, let me commence the
description of ITM by stating that it is an attempt to apply the above
guidelines in a certain way, one of several ways that one assumes are
open for such application. The master metaphors of the model are
those of landscape or topography, and the geometrical circle: they
help to “figure out” what ideology means. The model provides for
two different spheres of domination; for different cultural levels of do-
minating discourses (from macro to micro); for different discursive “for-
mations” situated on these levels (such as techno-scientism, selfism,
ethno-nationalism, consumerism, the social movement culture, and
so on); for different categories of social domination (class, race, gender,
culture, and so on) that interact with the formations in various ways,
and for different “worlds” of ideology such as ordinary-everyday
experience, scientific-theoretical reflection (here we find philosophical
or inter-disciplinary as well as intra-disciplinary ideologies like struc-
turalism, critical realism, ultra-Darwinism, and so on) and artistic
creation or aesthetic criticism (like romanticism, expressionism, sur-
realism, and so on). Of course, the intention is not to brand science,
or the concern with the self, or the social movements as intrinsically
ideological. The idea is rather to analyse the ideological aspect of
such phenomena: the level at which they begin to assume the charac-
teristics of ideologies.14
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14 With reference to the dominating discourses I have referred to, and the macro-
micro levels on which these function, a word of explanation. Techno-scientism,




ITM focuses on discourse in so far as it mediates group domina-
tion on the one hand and represents conceptual forms of domination
on the other (these forms consisting of the dominating effects of some
norms and values upon others, as well as the cultural dominance of a
complex of discourses). In terms of group domination, attention is
paid to discursive strategies such as legitimation, standardisation,
the use of metaphor and the creation of enemy images, and so on (cf
Thompson 1990: 60-7 for examples). In terms of conceptual domi-
nation, the main mechanism postulated is the mode of “hypernorma-
tive” conceptualisation. Basically, this entails conceptually “moving”
some norm, value or goal from its relativising coherence with other
norms/values/goals in a certain domain, and “landing” it in a “hyper-
normative position”, from where it dominates the concepts with
which it “formerly” cohered so closely. This domination occurs in va-
rious ways, one of which is a kind of “filtering” whereby, for example,
the concept of the just or the good or the beautiful is determined as
that which is (in some way or another) in line with the hypernorma-
tive norm/goal, say for instance something like scientific understand-
ing (in the case of scientistic reasoning) or national survival (in the
case of ethno-nationalist discourse).
The mechanism of hypernormative conceptualisation seems to
suffice for describing ideological processes in the ordinary-everyday
world at a certain level. In the worlds of specialised (scientific and
aesthetic) discourses, a more elaborate analysis of power relations be-
tween concepts is needed — especially in respect of the genuine theo-
ing power” of modern Western culture. Something like ethno-nationalist ideo-
logy, or the selfist ideology, will function on “intermediate” or more “central”
levels, and on the micro level we will find personalised (“pastoral”) ideologies
that cater for individuals, like consumerism, aestheticism, moralism, and so on.
I may note that, while there is an argument to be made for classifying media
power as a “steering power” (think of what may be labelled as the mediatisation
of contemporary culture), it seems more accurate to situate media power topo-
graphically “between” the steering powers (techno-science, political-adminis-
trative and economic power) and the social protest culture that reacts against
these powers. One reason for this topographical positioning is that it captures
the fact that the media does in fact give expression to this discursive conflict,
contrary to what Chomsky believes (in adhering to a somewhat old-fashioned
ideology theory, cf the fourth of the criteria outlined above).
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retical constructs. This is where the conceptual-semantic subtheory
of DA, which analyses ontological or metaphysical formulas, interacts
with ITM.
Much more can be said about ITM theory in general, and about
specific forms of analysis in particular, but in the present context this
is not necessary, and we may move on to the issue of (ideology-) “ad-
jacent” perspectives.15
These perspectives may be thought of as “theories” in their own
right, theories that are not part of the ITM model in the narrower
sense, but that can be pictured as “immediately adjacent” to it, in the
context of social and cultural archaeology. The idea is that ideology
analysis is in need of these “back-up” theories explain certain features
of the ideological world. The first of these is a theory of social and
cultural differentiation or “learning processes” (to borrow a term from
Habermas). Such a theory (a version of which was formulated by Max
Weber) is needed to describe the differentiation, integration, and in-
dividualisation processes that have produced the “developed” Western
culture (with its relatively autonomous scientific-technological, moral,
legal, aesthetic, economic and other domains) that ITM analyses in
its ideological forms. The same theory must also compare these cul-
tural learning processes with relatively undifferentiated cultures in
which such differentiation of domains is not found, and venture to
explain the difference. It is in the context of this particular theory,
and its link to ideology theory, that an answer is also to be given to
questions (coming from multiculturalists, among others) regarding
the supposed superiority of Western culture and society. Without going
into the matter now, I can only point out that the inter-theoretical
link here makes it impossible to separate “development” from its dark
15 For more detailed discussion of ITM, cf Visagie 1996. In recent work on ITM,
it has seemed necessary to broaden the scope of the “social domination” sphere
of the model, so that it can also accommodate more “refined” kinds of domina-
tion than “raw” class or race or gender polarities. I am thinking here of themes
such as the struggle of groups to gain not only legally enforceable rights but
also authentic social recognition (cf Taylor 1992); the micro-distancing that can
occur between subgroups of a given subculture, and the exclusions (“under-
classes”) that can almost invisibly arise in terms of employment, housing,
higher education, and so on (cf Habermas 2001: 50).
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side: the massive ideological deformations of modernity — deforma-
tions that are, ironically enough, ideologically absent from isolated
and un- (or under-) differentiated societies. I will return to this crucial
point below.
A second “adjacent” theory is (an acceptable version of) globalisa-
tion theory. Again, it can easily be shown that there is a very close
conceptual link between this theory and the two preceding ones, be-
cause normative globalisation is evidently related to social and cultural
differentiation and (especially) to integration. At the same time, the
ideological infiltration of these integration processes accounts for the
bad name that globalisation currently has, and for the reactions it
evokes from social protest cultures around the world. I would also
like to point out in passing that the link between differentiation
theory and globalisation theory actually accounts for something that
many find bewildering, namely the accelerated individualisation
processes that appear to run counter to globalised integration on va-
rious levels. But “appear” is the operative term, because differentiation
theory makes it clear that intensifying individualisation can run parallel
to intensifying integration.16
At this stage, and with a view to the topics introduced below, it
may be useful to pose the practical question: what does the ideology
analyst (working with ITM) actually do? There are various ways of
answering this question. One description might be something like
16 The cultural analyses of Charles Taylor, for example, show a clear awareness of
this relationship. Cf also Habermas 2001: 75-6. Actually a third perspective or
“adjacent theory” should be distinguished in the present context: that of the
“lifeworld” (in roughly the sense of Habermas) in which (in the ITM recon-
struction) normative learning processes, differentiated life-spheres, and ideolo-
gical topography come together in that immediate and unreflected socio-
cultural world in which we live from day to day with utter familiarity. This
lifeworld is populated by constituent lifeworlds — the social structures in
which we exist, such as family, neighborhood, city, state, and so on. Note, by
the way, that the differentiated “autonomous domains” that I have listed in con-
nection with the first adjacent theory are not described here in the context of a
Habermasian dualism between “lifeworld” and “system”. To my mind such a
dualism is unnecessary and distorting: administative-bureaucratic structures
and the domain of the economy (the Habermasian “system”) are also part of an
all-encompasing and all-integrating lifeworld (and its ideological counterpart).
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this: Briefly put (and keeping to the “everyday world” of ideology),
the ideology specialist analyses discourses to determine the precise
nature of the discursive constructions operating at the level of their
ideological “deep structure”. The analyst takes into account both the
hypernormative mechanism and the other legitimising strategies
relating to the sphere of group domination. In terms of the former,
an analysis can begin when (for whatever purpose) some ideological
formation or other (ethno-nationalism or whatever) is identified, and
the exact mode of its hypernormative declensions or distortions (of
science, history, society, art, morality, politics, education, healthcare,
or whatever) is determined. The relations between this hypernorma-
tive logic and the logics of other ideological formations that may be
linked to it are then traced, to see how different hypernorms are them-
selves involved in a play of dominance.17 The focus thereupon moves
to the possible relation between this topographical construct and actual
forms of social domination, pinpointing the exact forms involved
(denominators of class, race, gender, age, or whatever), and the type
of interaction that occurs.18 In this connection, the particular legiti-
mising strategies that occur are determined, as well as their links
with hypernormative modes of conceptualisation.
Alternatively, the ideology analyst may consider the object of ana-
lysis as something that is not already represented on the ideological
landscape (as ethno-nationalism is). Think of something like the so-
cial and cultural functions of a large city, or the phenomenon of
“higher education”, for example. The ITM heuristic determines that
the analysis views such an object through all the topographical levels,
in order to ascertain if, or more probably how, they impact on the
object concerned. In other words the mistake of identifying an object
with a specific ideological formation/discourse must be avoided. On
the other hand, one may expect some of the ideological connections that
come to light to feature more prominently in the complex ideological
profile of the object than others. More abstractly, the analyst will in
the end also have to pose the question whether this object, if it carries
17 Think for example of the relation between state security and national survival.
18 For instance the relation between securocratic ethno-nationalism and apartheid-




enough ideological “weight”, should not in fact be added to the ar-
chitecture of the topography itself.
So much for two different ways in which ITM analysis may be
described. There are also other ways. However, actual practice and
formal description are also two different things. And of course one
does not want to fall prey to a methodological positivism. The further
unfolding of this article (except for the next section) might itself be
seen as a kind of demonstration of the ITM approach. But it will pre-
sent a picture rather different from the one just painted, which I sus-
pect is a good thing, and possibly an indication of the kind of “ma-
noeuvering space” one actually wants here where theory, methodo-
logy, freedom and creativity come together.
Looking back at the nine criteria outlined above, we should
perhaps note here the actual way in which ITM attempts to satisfy
them. To begin, the model is negative in the sense of interpreting
ideology as domination, but the latter concept (distinguished from
normative power) is expanded in terms of the two spheres or two
“halves” of the ideological landscape — discourse domination and so-
cial domination. Each sphere comprises a multiplicity of ideological
structures, and the “upper” (or discourse) sphere exhibits lines of ten-
sion between different ideological levels — notably between the
steering and the social movement levels. Furthermore, the discourse
sphere differentiates into two sectors (or “worlds”) of specialised dis-
courses, relating to theoretical and aesthetic norms. The analysis of
ideological mechanisms in both spheres postulates complex cognitive
constructs, ranging from the rhetorical “strategies” behind social do-
mination to the “hypernormative” conceptualisations that denaturalise
norms and values.19
In terms of the communicative aspect of ideology theory, it may
be pointed out that, in spite of the highly idiosyncratic structure of
ITM, it stands in a “structural dialogue” with the concepts and mo-
dels of many other theorists. For example, the kind of “structural
19 The complexity of these constructs cannot be adequately shown here, as this
would infringe upon the space allowed for the other themes of this article; for
further and more formal discussion, the reader is referred to other writings by
the author, cited in the bibliography. However, the nature of hypernormative
constructs will receive some attention below.
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space” that can accommodate neo-marxist perspectives is apparent in
the upper levels of the upper sphere (where techno-science, economic
power and administrative reason can be “accommodated”); Foucault’s
notion of “pastoral power” can be accommodated on the lower levels
of this sphere in terms of a level of “protective power”; Christopher
Lasch’s critique of the culture of narcissism informs the “central”
formations of selfism and the achievement ideology.20
Finally, in relation to the element of self-criticism, the under-
standing of ITM is that the critical analyst of the topography is her-
self also situated within that topography. This “situatedness” is perhaps
most precarious at the micro-levels, where ideology reaches most
intimately into individual lives — ultimately via “pastoral havens”
that consist of such hypernormative attractions as prestige, pos-
sessions, art and entertainment. From another perspective, ITM can
possibly criticise itself for being “structural” and formal enough, but
insufficiently developed in terms of (provision for) concrete social
and historical context. This criticism has been levelled against the
model by Thompson (personal communication).
However, there is an underlying problem here: the question of
whether or not a given project may legitimately and unavoidably ab-
stract from concrete contexts, for the sake of developing “deeper”
theories. This issue has even received some notoriety in the “linguistic
wars” raging with varying intensity between Chomskyan theorists and
their context-sensitive opponents. The latter include postmodern anti-
theorists, which brings us to the next topic.
4. Posthumanism and its relation to postmodernism 
A certain reading of ITM may suggest a philosophical worldview —
a rather attractive one to my mind — that can perhaps be labelled as
(a form of) “posthumanism”. I am referring to the fact that one can
have a version of ITM that
• indexes all the well-known philosophical paradigms (located in
the scientific-theoretical area of the topography), thereby inter-
preting them (in a technical sense, with reference to their “decon-
20 All of this is elucidated in other discussions of ITM — see the preceding biblio-
graphical remark and note 13.
structable” conceptual-semantic ground-formulas, as above) as ideo-
logically distorting, and
• similarly lists (in a different area of the topography) all the celebra-
ted norm, value, and goal constellations of modernity (like techno-
science, freedom, progress, happiness, self-expression, moral and
artistic autonomy, etc), hereby indicating their faulty functioning
in modern culture.
This raises the question of the viewpoint that ITM (or even DA
theory as such) itself must necessarily represent.21 The version of
ITM that I want to discuss here does not introduce itself with refer-
ence to religious paradigms, or find an Archimedean point in any of
the accepted alternatives: the idealisation of science, or morality, or
aesthetic experience, or whatever. On the contrary, these alternatives
are topographically “shelved” (as far as their micro-functions are con-
cerned) as “pastoral shelters”.22 Moreover, this version of ITM is also
heavily dependent on the DA subtheory that stresses the all-pervasive
coherences of reality, making it impossible to select any of these (or
other) shelters (or indeed any topographical entity at any level) as a
point of departure, even apart from their ideological functions. And
on top of this, the apparently healthy postmodern relativism that all
of this seems to lead us to is indexed along with the other paradigms,
by ITM as ideological in nature.23
How can we make sense of such “post-postmodern” relativity?
One may be struck by the fact that, in its apparently totalising
critique (of ideologies and critiques), the version of ITM that I am
exploring seems to imply, unavoidably, a kind of other-worldly per-
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21 The matter of DA theory’s “worldview” (a theme that also transfers to all the
subtheories, including ideology theory) is something to be settled in the con-
text of a particular subtheory that deals with all manner of “in-house” philoso-
phical issues such as the interrelationships between subtheories, shared charac-
teristics, relationships with other disciplines (like psychology or the philosophy
of science), and so on.
22 By implication, the historical gnosis of Foucault or the aesthetic commitments
of Adorno must be rejected as a basis for the critique of ideology.
23 Which means that postmodernism is not as relativist as it appears, and that it
is to be seen as one of the philosophies belonging to the ideological topography
of modernity — in spite of epochal pretensions.
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spective: in fact one which resembles a religious transcendence view-
point, from which the values of a secularised society are all rejected,
and the world and everything in it ontologically relativised. Call this
the religious critique of “humanism” (with which we are all familiar).
Of course, various secular-philosophical discourses have been descri-
bed (or have described themselves) as rejecting “humanism” — think
only of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault. But the ITM that I am de-
scribing here, while recognising the advanced state of these anti-
humanist critiques, ultimately rejects them as based on ideologised
formulae — a fact that may seem to accord with the religious critique
of humanism, except that religion is not brought into the debate; in-
deed, is questioned from a post-metaphysical standpoint.
While this ITM may take over from religious and philosophical
critiques the concept and the rejection of “humanism”, it is crucially
important to realise that it does not take over the reasons for this re-
jection. Given the initial humanist revolt against institutional and
metaphysical religion; the kind of humanistic modernity this revolt
engendered; the secular anti-humanism and postmodernism that reacted
against this modernity, and the religious critique of all three develop-
ments — the emergence of a critique that recognises the first but is
dissatisfied with all the other developments can only be of a “posthu-
manist” nature in a very particular sense of the term. It is a critique
that cannot go back to any previous position. It is sympathetic to the
Enlightenment’s path to worldliness, to religion’s radical refusal of
this worldliness, and to postmodernism’s pathless worldliness. But
the humanism that is rejected here is (in ITM context) a humanism
that, in its revolt against religious authority, “reason” and unreason,
could not help dressing itself in hypernormative discourses and prac-
tices.
To adopt a position that would merit being labelled as posthuma-
nist (in the above sense) today would amount to rejecting the essen-
tially hybrid character of modernity as it actually exists (a tragic mix
of emancipation and domination) and distancing ourselves from it, as
if we had in fact been “converted” to an other-worldly transcendence
standpoint, from which the damaged state of our world could be
acknowledged. For a posthumanist, the term “humanism” actually
stands for this hybrid world. Posthumanists think “as if” they belong
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24 Modernity is still a relatively young epoch, historically speaking; its forces are
still vibrant and energetic, and their interactions are still growing in complexity.
to another place, another reality, one that stands in judgment over all
humanist modernity. This judgment can (or should) be realised in
(among other things) radical-critical reflection (“theory”) and in radical-
critical action (“practice”). Ideology theory can be one particular ex-
pression of such reflection. But the same ideology theory (the version
being discussed) also holds that the analyst sits in judgment on him/
herself. For, though we should think as if we were not “of the world”,
in actual fact we cannot do otherwise than remain “in the world”.
Unlike postmodernists, posthumanists do not think that modernity
can be left behind in a new worldview.24 At most, posthumanism can
be a gesture or a movement within the modern world, but running
counter (qua intention) to its humanist form. Posthumanists are sen-
sitive to the fact that their own critical tools have to be forged largely
from modern materials, and they know that ultimately their own
discourse cannot — in places — escape the ideological traps of mo-
dernity. The problem with postmodernism is not that it wants to set
itself off against the contorted forms and shapes of modernity (post-
humanists are in agreement with this); it is that it has a utopian
vision of a break with the past; that it seems to be more interested in
de(con)struction than in reconstruction (of systematic thinking and
of the normative elements in modernity); that it cannot recognise its
own reproduction of the imbalances typical of modernity, and that its
“index” of idols and illusions therefore cannot be as (topographical-
ly) extensive as the one that posthumanists are working on. In fact,
from where we stand, postmodernism can be seen as a form of late
humanism, as one of the successive anti-humanisms (in the irration-
alist tradition) within humanism.
On the other hand, it is true that postmodernists also possess in-
sights into the failed freedom of modernity. Therefore they should
not be looked upon as mere targets for posthumanist critique. Their
insights into the modern condition must also be co-opted within it.
Co-opting is a communicative gesture that does not really fit in with
the deconstructionist ethos, which prefers a more aggressive approach
and a form of immanence criticism that is quite legitimate but limited
in scope. A more complex critique also includes attention to specific
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ideological settings, as well as the constructive moment of comparing
the “criticising” theory/model — which theory is a deconstructionist
taboo — with the “target” theory/model.25
Although posthumanists do not actually possess a transcendent
viewpoint, they have access to a critical tool that may in some sense
come nearest to such a viewpoint. This is the tool of an understanding
of the relation between uniqueness and coherence.26 I mean the very
broad, basic and general truth (virtually a truism) that things are uni-
que and that they cohere with one another. These two polar truths,
taken together, have an extremely sharp critical implication. It is that
nothing must be hypostatised, over-emphasised, selectively privile-
ged, or one-sidedly promoted.27 This would disturb the set of imme-
diate coherences in which a given thing exists, simultaneously de-
tracting from the uniqueness of the things surrounding it.28 And
this, in a nutshell, is what modernity and humanism are guilty of (in
ideological terms): a vast topography of such imbalances.
Therefore, a central task of posthumanism is to become clear
about the real extent of this enticing but unstable landscape that forms
part of our lifeworld. However, as stated before, modernity also re-
presents certain learning processes, certain differentiations and inte-
25 The conclusions reached at the end of this paragraph are linked to some sub-
theoretical perspectives derived from DA. The reference to an “irrationalist tra-
dition” is also part of the ITM topography, and situated in the area of theoretical
ideologies. I use the concept of co-optation in a technical-theoretical sense, de-
rived from one of the DA subtheories dealing with communication as a ground-
structure, and with various communication models. Co-optation represents one
of these models — it may be compared to the combat, consensus and compro-
mise models. Deconstruction essentially opts for the combat model. Finally,
with regard to the various forms of criticism, these distinctions (together with
the concept of redeemable “truth elements”) belong to truth theory (or a theory
of truth).
26 This “tool”, in a refined and developed form, counts as yet another DA sub-theory
(of which there are about 16 altogether). It also deals with the phenomenon of
“dualism”: something that happens when some basic coherence is disturbed.
27 It is in this context that the religious critique of humanist “idolatry” has, in
principle, a certain lethal effectiveness.
28 Of course I am not talking about value priorities as such, or about a science
abstracting its object of study from a network of coherences.
grations (an emerged multiplicity of uniqueness and coherence) that
nobody wants to dissolve, in spite of the damaged forms in which
they function. This is the normative achievement of modernity with-
out which the ideological topography would never have existed.
(After all, the ideological form of science or art, or the self, presup-
poses their emerging individuality and autonomy.) Thus, besides de-
fending the uniqueness and coherence of things, posthumanists also
defend the right of the formations and discourses of modernity/
humanism to be redeemed — to have their relative truth moments
saved from the wanton destruction of “radical” critiques (which are
therefore not as radical as they themselves imagine).29
Does the foregoing sketch of a specific posthumanist attitude imply
that it is spiritually barren? No, not necessarily. The kind of posthu-
manists I have in mind can be just as serious as institutionalised re-
ligions about the need for a spiritual dimension to life. In somewhat
more technical terms, this is the need for a basic human “posture” of
contemplating and experiencing the extraordinary and the overwhelm-
ing, to complement the “posture” of everyday-involvedness in home
and work, and in the material world.30
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29 Underlying the final comments of this paragraph is a “constellation” of  four
DA subtheories, linked together by the discursive context in which their res-
pective “objects” are mentioned: ITM; the “ideology adjacent” theory of cultu-
ral differentiation; truth theory (cf note 25), and the uniqueness/coherence/
dualism (UC) theory. Regarding the latter, I note in passing that Habermas’s
theory of rationality, Chomsky’s model of aspects of the world, and Ricoeur’s
model of hierarchical levels of human experience, all depend on some version of
a UC thesis. On the other hand, Derrida’s infamous différance depends on igno-
ring the coherence, inherent in human categorising, between identifying some-
thing (the positive element) and at the same time distinguishing it from some-
thing else (the negative element). Derrida’s original double-trick was to isolate
the negative element and to semiotise its conceptual-analytical character.
30 The reference here is to DA “postural theory”: an ethical/moral model of a set
of postures (a dozen or so) depicting the human condition and attempting to
answer one of the ultimate questions: what must I do? This set of postures offers
a unique field of play for ethical or moral theories. It also constitutes a conti-
nuing temptation for selective privileging of one or more postures.
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However, this posthumanist spirituality does not necessarily have
to subscribe to what it takes to be an essentially metaphysical-dualistic
worldview (matter versus spirit; body versus soul; time versus eterni-
ty; etc) in order to attach a deeper meaning to reality than a shallow
materialistic worldview allows, or to have spiritual experiences, or
value spiritual growth. And I am not talking about a “New Age”
type (in fact an ideological type) of spirituality here, which mostly
comes down to a mix of scientism, selfism, and “new consciousness”
transformationalism, together with various other elements from the
social movement culture. Rather, I have in mind the spiritual needs
of human beings, and the possibility of having these needs “really”
met — that is, by the very reality in which we find ourselves. The
many parts of this whole (of reality) can come to us in ordinary-
everyday occurrences, or in theoretically disclosed understanding, or
in art, or in spiritual experience. That is the wonder of it. For exam-
ple, the lifeworld — of which mention has already been made — is
something that overwhelms us in our daily lives, in our moment-to-
moment involvement with the world; it is also something that can
be analysed sociologically; something that can be artistically repre-
sented; and, finally, something that can really grip us, in our mo-
ments of deep-contemplative awareness, as the source not only of our
troubles, but also of justice, solidarity, healing and care (think of the
social relationships and societal institutions that provide for all of
this, even if imperfectly), and even of the basic existential security
that our daily routine presupposes.
There are many other large realities in our lives, not just the life-
world as such, and basically the same thing goes for them as well. For
example, we know from our cognitive and linguistic understanding
that various things exist in hierarchical relationships in space and
time, and we can make a theoretical study of philosophical formulas
involving such relationships. For example, think of some or other X
preceding or grounding or transcending some or other Y (which is in
fact what is done by the DA theory of conceptual-semantic formulas
mentioned above), but suddenly experiencing this ordinary cognitive-
linguistic reality at a totally different level. This happens when, on a
deep existential level, we are “addressed” by what should take prece-
dence in our lives at a time of crisis, or what constitutes a trustworthy
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ground for the most important decisions that we have to make, or
what transcends meaninglessness, suffering, and death. It can even
happen that we feel addressed by Beginning or End, Ground or
Transcendence itself. Although in one sense we are dealing throughout
with the same concepts (familiar from ordinary thought and language),
in another we are not, since these concepts can be thought or spoken
or written in ordinary/everyday contexts, or analysed at a theoretical
level, or seen to represent a deeply motivating force at a spiritual
level.31 In fact, it appears to be something like this latter kind of mo-
tivation, linked, for example, to the category of ungraspable trans-
cendence, that enables Caputo (1997) to find a kind of “religion” in
the works of Jacques Derrida.
Let me briefly refer again to some basic postures of human existence.
Working, caring for one’s family, seeking contemplative distance,
letting go of what needs to be released, accepting suffering and guilt,
striving after hope, joy, or compassion — these “ordinary” acts also
mark the “spiritual” path. This is not a strange belief, but part of the
Jewish-Christian tradition, illustrating its typical “earthliness”. In
terms of postural theory, it boils down to the fact that one must thus
distinguish between contemplative and ecstatic experience, and also
31 This distinction was emphasised by the neo-Calvinist Dutch philosopher, Her-
man Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) in his notion of a “religious ground-motive” (cf
for example Dooyeweerd 1960: 113-172). Another of his notable contributions
was a theory of so-called modal law-spheres (also explained in the book just re-
ferred to), a model which (aside from its metaphysical elements) has some re-
markable similarities to Chomsky’s idea of the “aspects of the world” which dif-
ferent disciplines may study in an attempt to determine the principles charac-
teristic of these aspects (cf Chomsky 1996: 31-54). Other versions of “aspect
models” are found in the philosophical distinctions of Habermas and Ricoeur,
linked to conceptions of unique but cohering values, norms or principles (cf
note 29). Remarkably, this kind of basic distinction is not (to my knowledge)
found in anti-rationalist philosophies. In the DA model, an adequate theory of
principled “aspects of the world” (the biotic, physical, “science-forming”, lin-
guistic, aesthetic, and moral aspects feature, among others, in Chomsky’s informal
conception) constitutes the first subtheory, followed by the postural subtheory
(cf note 30). A spectrum of “aspects” also provides some fundamental catego-
ries, which can be used in a number of other subtheories. In ITM for example,
some of the aspects can serve as a partial index of “pastoral” ideological forma-
tions (cf note 14).
between these kinds of experiences and the rest of the postural spec-
trum. Although the former offer us only a distinctive kind of spiri-
tual experience, they have come to be generally identified with what
is called spirituality. But the point here is that the larger realities
which ordinary human acts represent can on occasion encounter us on
a “deeper” spiritual level, as imperatives that arise to preserve our
existence in some way.
Precisely which parts of reality are “at hand” to assist someone in
meeting his/her deepest concerns, and precisely how this happens,
and how this encounter comes to be conceptually modelled — all
this is largely a matter of individual circumstances, temperament, ta-
lent, and so on. It is a matter of individual journeys, explorations,
creations.32 A first thing this does not mean is that a community of
people thinking similarly on these issues cannot exist — even if
thinly spread across cities, countries and cultures. Such spiritually-
minded posthumanists would be very interested in communicating
with one another, with the institutional religions, and also with
spiritually-minded scientists, artists, and philosophers (across the
ages). One of the reasons for this interest in communication is that
the posthumanists’ holistic models of reality allow them to understand
and reinterpret elements from such diverse (religious/philosophical)
worldviews as, for example, Jewish and Christian anthropomorphism;
its mystical offshoots; humanistic scientism; the being and trans-
cendence metaphysics of humanist existentialism; New Age spiri-
tualism; Hinduist changelessness, or Zen-Buddhist flux and empti-
ness (with its close ties to Derrida’s deconstructionism). All of these
represent various visions of an Origin, a Ground, a Whole, a Trans-
cending Immanence. But in a certain sense everybody speaks the same
language in so far as we experience the same reality and share the same
conceptual apparatus for thinking, not only on a concrete-practical
level, but also with regard to abstract-theoretical and even “spiritual”
thoughts. (The universal terms I have just used to talk about “various
visions” actually illustrate this.) There is even a kind of spiritual
appeal to be discerned by posthumanists in the nature of communi-
cation — itself also one of the larger structures of reality. Continu-
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32 The element of individual and creative interpretation, in the context of one’s
own salvation, is remarkably prominent in Jewish mysticism.
ously expanding our own understanding of reality helps us not only
to be aware of the ultimately Real (in its unity and variety), but also
to understand the Realities confessed by others, and to see where they
fit in, wherein their appeal lies, and what they have to teach us.33
The second thing that all of this does not mean is that such (spi-
ritually-minded) posthumanist “communications” are not highly cri-
tical. They are, extremely so. They also avail themselves of the scien-
tific and philosophical tools of critique. They relentlessly pick out
the dualisms, hypostatisations, metaphorical imbalances, and ideolo-
gical deep structures in what people have to say. And they are very
much aware of the critical edge given them by the Christian roots of
their Western culture, when it comes to the appreciation of the world
on the one hand, and sensitivity to the idolisation of its contents on
the other.
One of the advantages of this kind of understanding of spiri-
tuality is that there is obviously a deeply satisfying continuity here
between our lives in the world and our scientific understanding as
well as our spiritual experience of the world. What we have here are
different dimensions of the same reality, not two or three fundament-
ally different realities.
Finally, however, it must be noted that a posthumanist spiritual-
ity (or even just “posthumanism” as described above) is definitely not
an integral part of ITM or of DA theory in a technical sense.34 In
other words, it is possible — and this is as it should be — for some-
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33 An example of the kind of communication that can be facilitated here is the rea-
lisation that Buddhist “emptiness”, deconstructionist absence and Christian-
philosophical notions of absolutisations or hypostatisations all meet in the theme
of the pervasive relativity of reality. From her side, the posthumanist believer
attaches importance to deep experiences of the “differences-in-coherence” that
characterise reality and produce its endless relativities (the theme of UC theory,
cf note 29), and also has a spiritual-existential understanding of the dark world
of idolatry and ideology that opposes the (grounding) truth of a certain ground-
lessness. Therefore, she can have interesting and mutually-enlightening conver-
sations (as Rorty would put it) with her Calvinist, Buddhist, and Deconstruc-
tionist friends.
34 Such interpretative issues would, however, be “structurally” allocated to a special
subtheory of DA, the internal “house philosophy” of the enterprise, as it were,
where the various subtheories and their interconnections are also articulated.
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one with other worldview persuasions nevertheless to make practical,
methodological use of these theories or to work on modifying their
design.
5. The pitfalls of multiculturalism
In the context of this article, I take “multiculturalism” to be a virtual
(sub-)movement, forming part of the broader social movement of PC
(“political correctness”) with which we have been familiar since the
late eighties. In its “strong” form, multiculturalism not only affirms
cultural diversity but actively questions the Eurocentric cultural su-
periority assumed to be implicit in the structures and models of the
academic world, also seeking to replace these — especially in respect
of the literary canon — with the creations of dominated and repressed
cultures. This is meant not only to counter the effects of Eurocentrism
as an ideology, but also to instil a cultural pride that is tragically
lacking in the people (especially the youth) of such repressed cul-
tures.35 In the course of its development, multiculturalism has at
times formed alliances with poststructuralist and neo- or post-Marxist
philosophies (among others), and come to constitute an ingredient of
the “critical theory” mix.36
Approaching multiculturalism from the ITM perspective, and
following the internal “heuristic” of this model (in roughly the Laka-
tosian sense), the first move is to focus on the suspected ideological
aspect of the target discourse (for whatever reasons this tentative
assumption, which, on further analysis, may prove false, has been
made). Thus postulating a form of multiculturalism as a typical ideo-
logical discourse (in the ITM sense), the next move is to locate it
within specific topographical “co-ordinates”. One of the main “for-
mation” categories on the socio-cultural topography is “social move-
35 “Strong” multiculturalism contrasts with a “weak” version which (in its weakest
form) serves only to signify the ideal of having various cultures live in “har-
mony” with one another, on university campuses, for example. In South African
institutions of post-apartheid higher education, the term “multicultural”, in
the latter sense, has become part of the administrative vocabulary.
36 Note here the topographical links between the more immediate socio-cultural




ments”. This category, as a theoretical construct, is juxtaposed to the
macro-level category of “steering powers” (as noted above). These
steering powers are the familiar targets of standard ideology theory:
techno-science in particular, as well as political-bureaucratic and eco-
nomic power structures — sometimes labelled as “the system”. Now,
the formation of the social movements exists in the “vicinity”, as it
were, of this steering complex, but there is a tension between the two.
For in crucial respects, the goals of the advanced social movements are
at odds with the systemic strategies and tactics of “the system”.37
Various other analytical manoeuvers can be performed around this
complex of goals and motives, but I shall pass over them and proceed
with the most important steps of our target analysis. Having located
multiculturalism within the topographical category of the social
movements, one may refine this finding in various ways. For example,
a formational discourse-entity labeled as PC (referred to above) may
already be part of the diagnostic with which we are working, along-
side other entities of the same category (the ecological movement or
the gay liberation movement, for example) or interacting with them.
In the case of PC, one would clearly indicate the collective nature of
this entity with respect to the goals of the other movements. One can
also attach subdiscourses to these categorical entities — for example
the different types of feminism or the notion of “deep ecology” —
and depict their interactions with other entities of the same category.
In the case of multiculturalism, we do not have a subdiscourse in this
sense, but rather PC as a kind of collective ideology, of which the
multiculturalist movement forms a part. Assuming this analysis to
be correct, the next crucial step would be to specify the hypernorma-
tive profile of multiculturalism explicitly — for it is only if we can
actually link multiculturalism to such a profile that the initial as-
sumption can be corroborated, clearing the way for this particular
discourse to be topographically “indexed”.
37 This is why Habermas appears to have addressed his communication theory to the
critical awareness that the movement culture represents. In the present context it
is not necessary to enter into the structural relations that exist between the move-
ment culture and other topographical formations. I can perhaps add here that,
apart from the social movements, religious fundamentalism (situated on the level
of the institutions of “protective power”) also poses a problem for “system” power.
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The particular “slot” of the hypernormative mechanism from
which control is exercised on its domain of action may in fact contain
more than one identifiable norm or goal or value. In the case of the
revolution ideology, for example, concepts such as “revolution” itself,
or “the struggle”, or “the people” can all attain hypernormative sta-
tus. In the case of multiculturalism, the same variability would
apply, in principle. What I want to draw attention to, however, is the
hypernormative power of the concept of culture in multiculturalism.
What I have in mind is the tendency of this discourse to judge
various accomplishments, products or works against the crucial cri-
terion of a given cultural horizon. And while we must acknowledge
that culture certainly is one of the “largest” of realities, we should
also realise that the same goes for nature, knowledge, personhood,
and so on — together with all the intertwinements that exist between
them (such relationships being the object of DA’s cross-cultural
ground-themes). In terms of the ideology that it opposes, multicul-
turalism focuses on the equally culturalist logic (basically Eurocen-
trism) associated with colonial domination (which ITM refers to the
sphere of group domination). In terms of its approach to repressed
cultures, multiculturalism seems to espouse the view that the crea-
tions of these cultures can and should hold their own against the
dominant culture, because of the very fact that they are “Other” and
bear the authentic signature of repressed cultures now finally coming
to self-expression, recognising the merits of, and taking pride in, in
their own creations — that is, in their cultural identity/difference.
The problem with this whole approach is that cultural criteria as
such do not yet represent aesthetic criteria (or other sets of criteria)
as such — although of course art and culture (together with everything
else) are intimately interwoven. For example, many of the standards
that critics apply to works of art are not normally explicitly thought
of as being intrinsically limited to the contingent time and space and
style of a “home culture” — otherwise there would not be the inter-
cultural appeal of internationally recognised artworks, or the inter-
cultural interest in what leading critics have to say, or the implicitly
trans-cultural tone of their reasoning. I am not saying that one can
create or evaluate outside a social or a cultural context, nor that this
context does not colour what we make and think — only that moral
or legal or scientific or aesthetic reasoning or insight is not as such
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merely about cultural expression. Furthermore, in our reasoning on
these other levels, we have to intend to come to grips with principles
or structures or norms that at least seem to transcend our local cul-
tural boundaries (hence the possibility of the moral, legal, scientific,
or aesthetic criticism — including self-criticism — of culture). Post-
modernists who try to deny this, taking the stance of culturalist re-
lativity, are (in the very discourse that they create to this end) involving
themselves in performative contradictions (as Habermas would say).
The general picture of the hypernormative structure of multicul-
turalism is then that of a kind of culturalism (in the commanding con-
ceptual slot) tending to dominate the “domain” of its subjugated con-
cepts or structures or aspects (as indicated above), whereby a given cul-
ture then becomes a criterion for what is considered to be, for example,
aesthetically or artistically good. But facets other than that of art will
join it in constituting the hypernormative domain that is at stake here:
questions about education, morality, politics, economy, history, lan-
guage, religion (and so on) all come to be approached with a certain
cultural “awareness” as their overall contextualising factor. Situated in
the hypernormative slot, this is the factor among all the others that is
not itself related to a contextualising factor, as this would go against
the hypernormative logic of having some central point of reference for
deciding what is evident, natural, reasonable, or just (within a signifi-
cantly large set of circumstances).
The multiculturist call to take pride in one’s own — because it is
one’s own — fits particularly well with another hypernormative dis-
course, that of selfism: the familiar ideology of egotistic narcissism
that many analysts have written about. Here, the “self” has hypernor-
mative status in concepts such as “discovering” or “creating” or “ful-
filling” or “expressing” (etc) oneself. Part of the story in modern
forms of this central ideological formation is taking pride in who and
what one is, without the traditional qualification of having to refer
to what one has actually done or achieved.38 It is easy to see how this
38 Here we encounter the topographical link between selfism and its counterpart,
a rampant achievement ideology — and the current tendency for the former
ideology to internalise the achievement hypernorm constitutive of the latter.
Classic studies of the selfist ideology are Lasch (1980) and Taylor (1991). Cf also
Hewitt (1998) for the connection with achievement ideology.
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hypernormative constellation (which has its own effects on art, mo-
rality, or education) can accommodate the multiculturalist’s cultural
pride — although one hypernorm is of a collective and the other of
an individual nature. I leave aside the theme of other inter-ideological
(topographical) relations in which multiculturalism may be involved;
the possibility and the theoretical context and scope for such analyses
has, I hope, been clarified by the foregoing remarks.
Although I have noted some affinities between multiculturalism
and poststructuralism (with its one-sided stress on multiplicity against
unity), it is understandable that someone like Derrida would not feel
comfortable with a culturally-centred discourse (or indeed with any
kind of centred discourse).39 In this respect, the kind of understand-
ing between, for example, deconstructionist, neo-Calvinist and post-
humanist critiques that I referred to earlier is, once again, possible.
Speaking of Derrida, it should perhaps be mentioned here that Paul
Ricoeur (1998: 51-7) also criticises an ideology of group identification
and cultural difference, specifically in terms of the social fragmenta-
tion that it engenders.
Of course, multiculturalists are right about the dark side of Euro-
centrism and  Western culture. They are right that the creations of
this culture reproduce its own fatal blind-spots. But they tend to
develop their own blind-spots, forgetting that the said cultural failures,
which are accompanied by moral failures, nevertheless contain traces
of normative insights and normative structures that can be recognised
and rescued from the ideological casts and cells in which they are
held captive. As for the dominated cultures now awakening to eman-
cipation and authenticity, they ought to be just as suspicious about
their own ideological connections, both past and present. And strong
39 Cf Derrida 1999: 55-6 for remarks on the theme of Africanisation. In the same
interview, Derrida correctly criticises what in the ITM framework would come
down to an ideological-topographical link between selfist and “protective power”
discourses, resulting in a hypernormative constellation in which morality, spe-
cifically the aspect of forgiveness, comes to be conceptually dominated by con-
cerns with the self and its psychological health. An outcome of this is that one
forgives not for the sake of the other, but for that of the self. Remarkably, this





multiculturalism is probably not the best philosophical defence avail-
able for a project of cultural emancipation. It is true, as Charles Taylor
(1992: 63-73) has famously argued, that the creations of cultures
struggling for recognition should certainly be regarded with positive
expectations about, for example, their intrinsic artistic worth. But
such a presumption should then be put to the test. I would suggest
the test of independent aesthetic or other criteria (to be argued about)
that are not just a totally idiosyncratic reflex-product of the culture
concerned, being automatically expressed in everything produced by
this culture. Otherwise, as Taylor notes, it is just a case of respect on
demand. And this is something that totally contradicts the recogni-
tion that these cultures really seek. It must also be conceded that the
kind of reasoning and the kind of norms we employ to judge some
product or way of life from another culture can be influenced (broad-
ened, expanded) by what we can learn from that culture, for cultural
learning processes are interwoven with intercultural communication.
Remarkably enough, Taylor (1992: 51-61) himself seems to fall
prey, on occasion, to a culturalist logic. This happens when he advo-
cates (in the communitarian style of thinking) a shift in the classical
liberal view of rights that enable threatened cultures to lay claim to
group-distinguishing legal protection in order to ensure their survi-
val. Taylor appeals here to a kind of cultural survivalism that reminds
one of Lasch’s (1984) critique of selfist survivalism. A crucial omis-
sion here, however, is the notion of criteria against which to measure
the issue of cultural survival. It seems historically problematic to as-
sume that a given culture must be continued, even to the extent of
making this a legal issue. Furthermore, there is the point raised by
Habermas (1995) concerning the need for the conscious appropria-
tion of a culture by its “members”, who have become convinced of its
intrinsic value. In this regard, new generations must have the chance
of affirming or contradicting this choice, and legal guarantees go
against this freedom. One should also realise that a culture contains
both positive and negative elements (as with the whole concept of a
“tradition”), so that the rational evaluation of culture should heed a
normative warning against any holistic survivalist imperative.
Let me conclude this section with a remark on one of the most
important “truth moments” in multiculturalism. When we reconstruct
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this element in the light of the theories of cultural differentiation and
globalisation mentioned earlier, it comes down to the fact that, amid
the differentiation and integration processes that mark socio-cultural
learning, with globalisation as a kind of culmination of integration,
multicultural discourse is in a position to emphasise in particular the
individualisations and the emergence of “local colour” that should be
part of the whole process. Cultural individualisation and cultural
integration are not at odds with each other; although factual tensions
may of course arise, they are in principle complementary normative
components of cultural development.
6. Remarks on ideology and Africa
It is obvious that multiculturalism and the ideal of emancipated African
cultures (including its constituent cultures) are highly relevant con-
cepts for the black peoples of Africa. The appeal of these concepts has
culminated in so-called Afrocentrism’s critique of Eurocentrism, which
has itself become part of multicultural discourse. From the foregoing
it will be clear how the ideological trap is sprung here: one ideology
evoking another; one culturalistic discourse answered by another —
two manifestations of the same hypernormative machinery.40
Taking the ideological measure of Africa against the ITM topo-
graphy, the first thing to note is of course the historical effect on this
continent of Eurocentric culturalism (the discourse ideology) playing
its part in the creation of a specific set of colonial relations of domi-
nation ranging over diverse regions and cultures (the social domi-
nation). In respect of the history of South Africa, we encounter at a
later stage the statist imperialism of the British Empire, and more re-
cently white Afrikaner ethno-nationalism, which took a decisive turn
in the struggle against British imperialism, consequently creating
race-based relations of domination (one type of group domination) in
the social sphere (the infamous apartheid).
40 From a topographical perspective, in the case of both Euro- and Afrocentrism
(and similar cases), one can speak of a formation of “macro-culturalism”, struc-
turally “higher” and more encompassing than the individual kind of culturalism




This ethno-nationalism, which included its own forms of statism
and economism, was in turn a stimulus for protest. Apartheid was
eventually dismantled (at least in the legal sense) with the culmina-
tion of a liberation struggle that saw the African National Congress
party come into power in 1994. But this did not happen without
another ideology entering the equation. I am referring to the revolu-
tionary, or “people’s”, or “struggle” ideology which was active in
black politics before the demise of apartheid. What occurred histo-
rically in South Africa was a true ideological spectacle: concepts of
morality, justice, education, and so on, were hypernormatively domi-
nated by Afrikaner nationalism on the one side, and, in a relation of
ideological symmetry, by revolutionary populism on the other (cf
Schoeman 1998: 55-102). Thus, a host of norms, principles and
values were caught in the political cross-fire, and it did not look as if
they were going to have a chance of free development within their
own operational areas. But with the emergence of the New South
Africa, the emancipation of norms and principles has indeed progres-
sed in important areas. As for the “normative” casualties of the con-
flict, we know from ideological battlefields of the past that history
will be more forgiving of the side of sedition.
With the current relevance of university programmes in “African
studies” (or some such label), it is certainly worth reminding our-
selves how this kind of “study” can become ideologically infected:
caught in the snare of one or more -isms (Euro-, Afro-, ethno-, or po-
pulocentrism). As Edward Said (1978) has noted in the case of the
Orient, ideological discourses are in fact able to create fictitious coun-
tries and cultures, and in the present case we should be aware of a
construct called “Africa”. However, in the case of Africa, we need to
heed the fact that such a fictitious Africa can be projected from the
side of the “natives” as well as from that of the “settlers”.
The foregoing remarks offer some preliminary idea of how the
ITM topography can be applied to Africa. But there remains much
to be said in this regard. For example, it should be clear that the
“steering powers” of ideological modernity (eg techno-science, diffe-
rentiated and systemic administrative-economic power), or the cen-
tral authenticity and achievement ideologies, among others, can only
penetrate to Africa from the ideological landscape of the West. There
 
is no doubt that this has taken place, but within the limits that still
make Africa an “Other” to the highly modernised societies of the
West. This means that young urban blacks, for example, are actually
living in a kind of ideological war zone, experiencing daily the con-
flict between their native “communalist” ethos (with community va-
lues dominating individuality) and the modern images of a Western-
styled pleasure-and-achievement individualism.
Of course, Africa has its own indigenous equivalents to the ideo-
logical structures we have been discussing here: there are the fixations
on tradition and on the community, for example (countering the
Western involvement with progress and the individual).41 And, in
correspondence to ITM’s social sphere of domination, there have al-
ways been stark forms of social power structures in Africa (gender-,
tribe- and age-related structures, for example). But in the past these
fixations and domination structures have operated in the context of
relatively undifferentiated communities, which constitutes a major
difference from the kind of landscape for which ITM is designed. As
for the path that Africa can follow in terms of systemic differentiation
and integration processes, such learning processes are tied to the very
notion of “development”. An authentic African critique of ideology
will have to free itself of the kind of cultural relativism that would
exclude any reference to an axis of social and cultural development,
and come to recognise the structural intertwinement of cultural states
of “pre-differentiation” with social states of group domination.
But this is not to say that cultural and social development is sy-
nonymous with the way the West has developed (a Eurocentric falla-
cy). On the contrary, Africa has much to learn from the ideological
mistakes of the West. A de-ideologised multiculturalism can in fact
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41 Which is of course not to say that ideologies of communality (such as “the
people”, or the nation, or the state, etc) are unknown in the West. For some il-
luminating perspectives on the positive and negative aspects of African and
Western cultural frameworks, cf Van der Walt 1997. As to the question of whe-
ther the term “ideology” should be used in connection with thought and action
in relatively undifferentiated societies, I do not think that there is a substantive
issue here: people are free to use terms as they wish, with proper explanation.
Personally, I would not use the term in this connection, given its technically defi-




give this real “saving perspective” to its adherents. However, the ac-
companying perspective would have to be a cautionary one, warning
that there seems to be no way to realise societal and cultural evolution
without making any ideological mistakes. We learn permanently like
a child learning to walk: stumbling forward, falling, getting up,
going forward a few steps.
Naturally I am aware of the fact that cultural relativists (or “cul-
turalists”) would not want to entertain the notion of “relatively un-
differentiated” cultures or societies. They would read this as typical
Eurocentric hubris. But there is really no way to escape using some
such notion, explicitly or implicitly. The hubris can be countered by
an awareness of the dismal ideological failures of more developed so-
cieties and by the recognition that development, in principle, does
not entail copying certain Western styles of development, as well as
by the realisation that ideals such as happiness, peace and content-
ment are not in any case directly tied to development — that in fact
the scarcity of these values has become a notorious clinical problem
in highly industrialised Western societies (Dews 1986: 166). On the
other hand, it would be an Afrocentric hubris that would preclude
the possibility for Africa (or other developing cultures) to take over
any achievement of modernity (in any field or area or sphere) and to
accommodate it to the individuality of the “receiving” culture, pos-
sibly “de-ideologising” it in the process.
On the whole, if one considers what is occurring in (internally deve-
loping and internationally socialising) Africa today, as seen from an
ideology-critical perspective, a rather depressing picture emerges (sadly
complementing our picture of Western modernity). There is a world
of complexly-related hypernormative discourses — technocratic eco-
nomism, politicism, revolutionary populism, statism and ethnicism,
to name but a few — that can partially compare to what we are
familiar with in the West. And these relate in various ways to a com-
plementary world of group struggles and social structures of domi-
nation — among them reverse racism, ironically enough. For Africa,
just as for the West, the only hope lies in cultural and societal self-
criticism. Ideology theory can play a small but important part in
achieving this. Clearly, it would be highly instructive to take some
of the ideological structures just mentioned and analyse exactly how
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hypernormative logic determines perceptions and interpretations (of
history, morality, justice, education, and so on) in each individual case
and in individual socio-historical contexts, or exactly how various local
discourses, implementing certain discursive strategies, facilitate forms
of social domination. In relation to ideology theory, the African expe-
rience can make an important contribution, not only in constituting
an object for theory (exemplifying both suffering under, and actively
creating, forms of domination), but also in shaping and reshaping
theory itself.
7. Africa and Afrikaner protest culture
At this point I would like to turn, finally, to an ongoing South Afri-
can debate. I have in mind what I will call the neo-Afrikaner protest
(mainly involving white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans who feel
culturally deprived in the “new” South Africa) against what is per-
ceived as a black African political onslaught against Afrikaners and
their culture — particularly in terms of educational policy and the
alleged domination of the Afrikaans language by the administrative
privileging of English (although both count among the official lan-
guages of the country). Against the background of what has emerged
so far, I think the following can be said about this emotional issue —
yet another illustration of how ITM can be used to focus on the ideo-
logical aspect of the whole debate:
• The Afrikaner protest campaign can (and indeed occasionally
does) attempt to find support in multiculturalist discourses, some
of them expressive of a poststructuralist type of pluralism. This
theoretical “infrastructure” lands the protest discourse in some of
the difficulties that have been examined above. Also, with a cer-
tain historical irony, the neo-Afrikaner brand of multiculturalist
activism is actually a manifestation of a formerly repressive (ethno-
nationalist) culture.
• From the outset it must be clear that there can be no question
about the fact that governments have to respect cultural rights (in-
cluding language rights). In a multicultural state, such cultural
rights have to be harmonised and integrated within a juridical




into a relation of domination (not to be confused with political
empowerment) with its own subjects. The integrative task of the
state can, for example, even involve government-sanctioned insti-
tutions of higher learning with a specific cultural character, where
language and religion are institutionally inscribed. In terms of
ideology theory, this is the reverse of group domination, namely
a manifestation of a group’s cultural freedom (to be distinguished
from group autonomy in the political sense) — a concept that
takes on specialised and technical meanings when it comes to the
legal-moral principles of state government. A government may
even be involved in helping to uphold an institution where a cul-
turalist ideology is clearly in control, as long as this ideological
discourse does not begin to create relations of domination in the
social sphere. Governments react to social injustice, not to con-
ceptual (hypernormative) injustice.
• A normative responsibility rests upon Afrikaner protesters (as
well as non-protesting members of the culture) to care not only
for their own culture, but also for the emerging national culture
(and indeed for an integrated global culture, which is the una-
voidable result of globalisation processes). This flows from the
normative requirements of socio-cultural integration and diffe-
rentiation dynamics. One may also say that it flows from a general
anti-ideological principle of “balance”, which I will informally for-
mulate here. In terms of the various social “identities” that people
have (or “offices” that they hold), a person is not first of all A, and
then B, and only then C; rather, he or she is all three (and more)
simultaneously, with varying value commitments tempered by mi-
nimal responsibilities. Thus, I am not first and foremost a research-
er; secondly a family man; thirdly involved in social activism, and
so on. This kind of reasoning would actually be typical of the
pastoral ideology of careerism, with the “first” responsibility in
fact dominating and distorting the others. In the same way, I am
not a loyal Afrikaner “first and foremost” (ethno-nationalist ideo-
logy), but rather simultaneously an Afrikaner, a South African,
and a citizen of the world, among other things.
• Noticeably lacking from this protest campaign is a concern with
political-moral remembrance and sensitivity. A people and a cul-
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ture which were the agents of apartheid (and as a whole still pride
themselves on their religious beliefs) should not allow themselves
to forget the horrors of the past in the name of a “healthy concern
with the present”. Painful lessons have to be borne in mind for
the sake of a culture’s spiritual transformation, integrity, and on-
going self-critique. In terms of ideology theory, we should be
aware of the hypernormative domination of moral responsibility by
national pride. Such domination can even create the ostensibly
moral ideal of a “strong and manly” culture.
• It should be remembered that a given culture’s future is something
that has to be debated and which requires communicative affir-
mation from its members — automatic legal protection of a mi-
nority culture can actually suppress this “democratisation” of
culture (as noted above). This perspective flows from an insight into
the dangers of a “survivalist” ideology, where the goal of survival
(on whatever level) rules hypernormatively over various norms
and principles of human conduct. Over and above this, there are
in any case substantial legal-philosophical problems associated with
the whole idea of “group rights” (cf Visagie & Pretorius 1993).
• The use of language is related to those social contexts (“life-
worlds”) that are normative for this use. In this respect a univer-
sity, for example, is not the place for a celebration of one’s lan-
guage or culture as such — though it is a place where such ties
tend to be obvious, and where they may also enjoy rights of their
own. This means that matters of academic interest override any
concern with cultural ideals in a situation where it is really the
former that have brought a group of people together, and a lan-
guage problem suddenly arises. Such a problem can only be over-
come by some language(s) taking a “back seat” (on this occasion)
to another. The choice of language here can only be determined by
the goal of academic communication, not cultural self-expression.
The same thing happens in a situation where one wants to com-
municate something to, say, the widest possible audience. With
reference to our critical theory, all of this has to do with prevent-
ing the domination of scholarly or academic goals, as well as the
communicative activities that are part of these goals, by a cultu-
ralist ideology.
 
• The most radical members of the Afrikaner protest culture aspire
to “self-government” of Afrikaners, and thus to a “Boerevolk”
state. They confuse freedom from ethnic and cultural domination
with an idea of self-governance, modeled on an outmoded notion
of state sovereignty. But we also see leftist and “postmodernist”
intellectuals, who despise the “authoritarian” or the “centrist”
idea of the state itself, being drawn towards the (federal) model of
a regionally-based constellation of “politically autonomous” peo-
ples and cultures. This may seem consonant with multiculturalist
ideals. But here, too, structural confusion between cultural free-
dom and political autonomy persists. In the first case above, it is
inspired by ethno-nationalist ideology; in the second, by anti-
state sentiments linked to post-Marxism or poststructuralism. It
is easy to see how such arguments might in fact be co-opted by
ethno-nationalist activists. And this is indeed one of the strange
intellectual-political partnerships to be found in present-day South
Africa.
8. Conclusion
Ideology analysts diagnose the discourses of cultures and societies.
They try to penetrate the surface of these discourses, to uncover hid-
den layers of meaning, where the unrefined perceptions, the raw con-
victions and the blatant contradictions become apparent. Their task
is to reveal to a society something like its own unconscious, to de-
scribe how the lust for domination arises in the conceptualising mind,
and how this is connected to many views, programmes and pursuits
that may seem only natural and necessary. What also needs to be ex-
plained is how such views arre actually transformed into patterns of
group domination and structural violence.
The resulting stories that analysts tell about advanced societies in
the West, about the cultural awakening of exploited societies, about
a suffering Africa seeking its own “rebirth” — these seem rather dark
and somber tales. The narrative is somehow always about the search
for knowledge, freedom, fulfilment, or happiness, but it invariably
depicts the protagonist going astray, losing the way, unable to be-
come free of the illusions, the fixations and the obsessions. Or some-




is the story of the protest movements, in particular. And the tragic
moment lies in the fact that the grand quest and the heroic struggle
against outside forces are fatally flawed from the outset, from within.
This seems to be a kind of ideological master-narrative, not only of
societies but also of the individuals that live in them.
The writer of these stories, the theorist or analyst, is also in a pre-
dicament. For nowhere can the theory that is doing the work come
up with a specific concept, value, goal or ideal that can serve as a clear
and uncontested foundation, a platform, a shelter in the ideological
storms. Such ideals were still embraced by earlier theories: scientific
knowledge, social freedom, personal transformation, the restitution
of nature, or the kingdom of some religion. Adorno felt the hopeless-
ness, recognised that everything was compromised and contaminated,
including critical reason and therapeutic theory itself. Yet he had one
thing left: the pastoral shelter of ultra-refined music. More recently,
the poststructuralists have also given up on centres and foundations.
Still, one sees them turning to their own last supports, such as em-
bracing the pure power that exists below — and beyond — good and
evil, or riding the waves of fluctuating word-meanings that flow over
all foundations, erode all distinctions.
But there are some writers of stories of domination who have wan-
dered even “past” the “post”-modern encampments. They know that
one cannot ever reach a mental space where no ground and no horizon
and no relative centre exist. They also know that foundationalism is
actually acceptable, as long as one has many things to serve as foun-
dations, interacting with one another, deconstructing one another.
This is actually the simple answer: the whole (of reality) and its parts.
It is an answer that can and should be developed until one has a genuine
theory with a number of interacting modules. The essence, however,
can be expressed in a few words: the world as it is. That which can
sustain practical life, and science, and spirituality. Only the world, as
it is, can be the death of ideology.
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